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FOUCAULT ON CONTINUITY:
THE POSTMODERN CHALLENGE TO TRADITION
James M. Byrne

The work of Michel Foucault poses a challenge to all thinking which situates
itself in the context of a tradition. This article outlines this challenge by
reference to Foucault's views on the continuity/discontinuity problem in history. When Foucault's own position is clarified in relation to a position of
absolute discontinuity it can be seen to offer possibilities for theological
thinking. The article concludes with some suggestions on the contributions
which Foucault's notion of history and tradition can offer to theology on the
formal levels of methodology, hermeneutics, discourse and the body.

Postmodernism has something of the character of the Yeti about it: spoken
of by many, glimpsed by a few, but it is difficult to find anyone willing to
give an exact description of the creature. The end of metaphysics, the death
of God, the disappearance of the author, the crisis of reason, the dissipation
of metanarratives and many other theories (which, their adherents often
claim, are not theories in the real sense but mere sites for discourse) have
been presented as marking the definitive demise of the modern. Descartes,
Kant, epistemology, ontology, meaning, the signified, and the subject are
'out'; Nietzsche, Derrida, discourse, the text, the trope, the signifier, and
grammar are 'in'. If the logic of the term 'postmodern' is indeed problematic,
something seems to be happening, even if those who claim to make it happen
are reluctant to say what it is. In these pages I will argue that one of the most
distinguishing characteristics of the 'postmodern' is an endemic crisis of
continuity which disrupts the accepted relationship between an event and a
subsequent tradition which gains its identity from the stability of that relationship. The writings of Michel Foucault offer a vivid picture of a postmodern
thinking which seeks to divest history of any such overtones of metaphysical
continuity. This view of history and tradition presents a radical challenge to the
theological commonplace that Christianity lives out of continuity with the event
and person of Jesus Christ, and that this relationship is firmly established on the
basis of the witness of the first followers of Jesus, codified in Scripture and
extended through the preaching and tradition of the church.
1. The 'Postmodern '; A Crisis of Continuity?
If we accept Martin Heidegger's claim that one of the most distinguishing

FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY

Vol. 9 No.3 July 1992
All rights reserved.

335

336

Faith and Philosophy

marks of the modern is that "man becomes the center and measure of all
beings,") then we can read the postmodern deconstruction of 'man' as selfconsciously anti-humanist. With the birth of the human sciences the human
subject increasingly became the object of her own critical reflection, and the
autonomous reason of the Enlightenment subject began to crumble. The end
of the modern view of the subject was marked by the dispassionate analysis
of structuralism, summed up in Levi-Strauss' dictum that "the ultimate goal
of the human sciences is not to constitute, but to dissolve man."2
What Levi-Strauss saw as a task, Michel Foucault saw as a destiny. In an
(in)famous text which vividly depicts his rejection of the Enlightenment view
of 'man', Foucault writes:
[M]an is an invention of recent date. And perhaps one nearing its end. If those
arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we
can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility-without knowing
either what its forms will be or what it promises-were to cause them to
crumble as the ground of classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth
century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face
drawn in sand at the edge of the sea. 3

This kerygmatic proclamation of the end of 'man', expressed in a careful conditional, betrays more hope than conviction. Is it that Foucault naively believed
that crying 'wolf' could bring about the destruction of the fold of classical
anthropology, or is his intention somewhat more subtle? The hyperbolic assertion
that "man is an invention" reveals that Foucault's aim is not to challenge the
'nature' of man (e.g., by suggesting a new anthropology) but rather to unveil, by
positing the possibility of erasure, the cultural mechanisms and discursive practices which gave rise to the accepted definition of 'man' and which allow it
to prevail over time. In other words, Foucault disregards the conventional
modes of argumentation in favor of a mode of persuasion which depends to
a large degree on its own rhetorical intensity, in which possibilities are hinted
at, conventions scorned, and long-established assumptions are called into
question as much by the strategic force of the argument as by the evidence
adduced. In this passage, 'man' functions as a metaphorical representation of
our propensity, as Foucault sees it, to build structures of continuity by ontologising viewpoints which in their actuality are nothing more than the products of a
particular socia-cultural dynamic and a certain set of power relations.
Although I shall claim that Foucault does not advocate absolute discontinuity, his anti-narratives do seek to undermine the view of the modern as
expressed by lean-Francois Lyotard when he describes as 'modern'
any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this
(philosophical) kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such
as the dialectics of spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of
the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth. 4

Foucault's historical analyses offer one focal point for many of the disparate
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elements which claim some affinity with the 'postmodem'. They seek to
disturb any easy relationship to our past by arguing that our assertion of
continuity with that past is itself an invention of our need to control the
destiny of our culture and society. This interrogation of the propensity of all
great narratives to domination through claims to absolute continuity is one
of the most distinguishing marks of the 'postmodem'.
However, whether such anti-narratives allow us to speak of a 'crisis of
continuity' is open to debate. For example, Allen Megill, the historian of
ideas, has argued that there is no postmodem 'crisis of continuity'. Megill
rejects the concept of 'crisis' on the basis that it presupposes the very notion
of continuity which it is purporting to call into question. He asserts that
"behind ... [the] notion of crisis lies the notion of history as constituting a
continuous process or movement that is somehow now in the process of being
broken."s If the notion of a crisis of continuity is to be intelligible, it can be so
only on the basis of the assumption that history has directionality. But it is
precisely this directionality which the notion of crisis is calling into question:
The convincing power of the crisis notion depends on one's prior belief in
the linear or directional character of history, yet the whole point of the crisis
notion is to undennine any such belief.6

Megill concurs with Richard Rorty's view that the notion of crisis is therefore "reactive,"? as it is simply a reaction against the assumption that there
is a process of continuity over time. Rorty and Megill are therefore prepared
to abandon the historical process itself. From this perspective, of course, the
more successful crisis thought is, the more it undermines its own raison
d'etre, for according to Megill, it is precisely "the belief that all continuity
has been lost"8 which underlies postmodern thought.
The radical nature of this view cannot be underestimated. Unlike 'crisis'
views of history, Megill, Rorty, Lyotard and others are not interested in
criticizing the prevailing basis of continuity in order to place it on a different
footing; rather they have no desire to posit any continuity whatsoever. Megill
can therefore argue that the notion of a crisis of continuity should be abandoned, on the grounds that it "presupposes what it sets out to destroy-the
idea of history as a continuous process, history with a capital H"9 (theologically we could say, 'tradition with a capital T'). However, the strong discontinuity advocated by Megill appears to be no less a metaphysical principle
than the continuity theory which he tries to debunk, and therefore cannot
simply be accepted as an absolute principle.
Despite this caveat, it is important to acknowledge that the radical
postmodernist perspective adopted by Megill serves to alert us to the seriousness of the contemporary challenge facing all forms of thought which assert
a line of continuity through time. In other words, the postmodem critique of
continuity calls into question the very possibility of tradition. In Megill's
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view one of the pioneers of the post-modern dissipation of tradition has been
Michel Foucault, as evidenced by his designation as a 'prophet of extremity';
however, it remains for us to judge whether or not Foucault's texts are in
agreement with the radical view of discontinuity advocated by Megill, or
whether they admit of more subtle gradations of continuity and discontinuity.

2. Foucault: The End of 'History' and 'Tradition'
The reader of Foucault is left in no doubt about the singularly unusual
character of his work, and Hugo Meynell's jUdgement that in Foucault one
meets "a unique blend of brilliant insight and criminal lunacy"JO is not altogether without foundation. However, if one were to risk a conventional locating of Foucault in the history of thought, it would have to be primarily in
relation to Nietzsche. Foucault shares the dominant Nietzschean theme of the
all-pervasive mechanisms of power at the root of all culture arid tradition.
For Nietzsche, as for Foucault later, it is tradition which consolidates and
preserves the ethical ideals and power-mechanisms which underlie all conventions and oppressions:
In things in which no tradition commands there is no morality; and the less
life is determined by tradition, the smaller the circle of morality. The free
human being is immoral because in all things he is determined to depend
upon himself and not upon a tradition. II

For Foucault, especially in his work of the nineteen-seventies, power is the
fundamental characteristic of human culture and tradition; it "is co-extensive
with the social body."12 According to Foucault's reading of Nietzsche, this
all-pervasive power is not to be equated simply with repression, but its dynamic is to be found "in the hostile engagement of forces"13 which characterizes all social relations. As power is so fundamental to human culture, it
cannot be viewed as a 'thing' which one either possesses or does not, and
which is then wielded over another as one wields a sword. To the contrary,
"power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised,
and ... it only exists in action. "14 When one considers power, argues Foucault,
"it is necessary to be a nominalist: power is not an institution, a structure, or
a certain force with which certain people are endowed; it is the name given
to a complex strategic relation in a given society. "IS
As power is only present in relations, it cannot be found as an inherent
possession of the intentional subject; power can only be studied "at the point
where its intention, if it has one, is completely invested in its real and effective practices,"16 i.e. in societies' institutions, laws, customs, etc. Foucault's
reading of power is therefore strongly anti-theory; as power can only be
discovered in its material and physical expressions, an a priori definition is
impossible. This is as true for society as for the individual; Foucault believes
that "the great fantasy is the idea of a social body constituted by the univer-
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sality of wills. Now the phenomenon of the social body is the effect not of a
consensus but of the materiality of power operating on the very bodies of individuals."17 In short, everyone has power and the locus of the effects of power is
the human body; hence Foucault's interest in penology, the asylum and sexuality.
This view of power means that power's role is not simply a negative one
of control. As Foucault comments, "power would be a fragile thing if its only
function were to repress." So, "far from preventing knowledge, power produces it"18 as, for example, in the case of the body where the exercise of
power over it gave rise to the growth in physiological knowledge. For
Foucault, in short, power is the means of production of knowledge.
But how does one go about analyzing the mechanisms of power in a given
culture, tradition or society? How does one unveil the operations of power
which lie at the heart of society's claims to continuity and stability? For
Foucault, this task is achieved primarily through the application of a
Nietzschean 'genealogical' mode of historical analysis which brings to the
surface those "subjugated knowledges"19 which have been hitherto viewed as
inconsequential. Two types of historical knowledge are combined in this
analysis: general, historical, knowledge which has been ignored or hidden,
and local, low-ranking, specific knowledge which was considered of no importance. Foucault gives the name 'genealogy' to "the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a histroical knowledge
of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today. "20
Foucault describes the aim of genealogical analysis as giving attention to
"local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the
claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order
them in the name of some true knowledge. "21 Genealogical analysis is therefore a reading of history which dispenses with the need for one central point
around which investigation must pivot, be that point a transcendental subject
or a metaphysics of historical continuity. Genealogical analysis investigates
traditions, cultures and societies as sites of the technical and positive application
of power in opposition to what Foucault sees as the West's concentration on
power as a purely juridical and negative property. For Foucault genealogy is the
unconditional analysis of the production and exercise of power.
Even from this outline it is clear that Foucault's notion of power is not
without its problems. Larry Ray has highlighted three points of weakness: i)
Foucault's analysis cannot distinguish between the exercise of power in different contexts; ii) it is not clear why we should view power as solely constitutive of social relations; and iii) Foucault's analysis lacks any method
which would enable us to make a normative distinction between legitimate
and non-legitimate uses of power.22 Of the three points, the latter would seem
to be the more serious, and this is a criticism shared by other critics. Hugo
Meynell, for example, asserts that Foucault's notion of power betrays a "lack
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of a coherent idea of the good, and of the human mental capacities which
favor the attainment of truth and the avoidance of error. "23 Colin Gordon, on
the other hand, holds that Foucault has taken the question of power beyond
the binary opposition of good and evil. In Gordon's view, Foucault's refusal
to view power dualisitically as exercised either benignly to provide stability
and coherence for the community or coercively as repressive and violent,
represents a "dual precaution of method"24 which results in the positive view
of power as productive of knowledge.
To adjudicate between these competing readings of Foucault would require
more space than is available to us in this paper. However, one point of
importance can be made: even if Foucault's texts do not reveal an immediate
ethic, this does not mean that they are inconsistent with any and every ethic.
It is one thing to say with Meynell that Foucault's texts lack an idea of the
good and quite another thing to say that his analysis of the operation of power
cannot be put to constructive use by various disciplines, such as theology,
which employ their own ethical criteria.
In the Nietzschean and Foucauldian world of genealogies, tradition (in the
double sense of something handed down and of the assumption of identity
over time) is an imposition upon the fragments of history. Tradition generally
represents a hegemony of power on all levels of society: social, economic,
cultural, etc. Therefore continuity must be broken, and the nineteenth century
flow of development which promised a climax to history is replaced by the
bewildering notion of "eternal return"25 which offers no resolution of a dialectic or no safe homecoming, a vision in which tradition becomes an impossibility. This Nietzschean methodology appears as somewhat cavalier, and
Foucault has been criticized frequently for the way in which he abuses the
accepted rules of rational discourse. 26 In this he is thoroughly Nietzschean.
For Nietzsche, thinking is no longer equated with Enlightenment rationality;
rather it is thinking which lays reason to rest. Foucault's desire for the disappearance of 'man' is prefigured in Nietzsche's caricature of the self of
Cartesian reason as a "grammatical fiction. "27
In his seminal essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,"28 which marks the
turn in his thought towards the genealogy of power relations, Foucault gives
one of his clearest statements on the question of history, tradition and continuity. He outlines a Nietzschean "genealogy" which "rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies" and which
"opposes itself to the search for origins" (NGH, p. 77). With Nietzsche,
Foucault denies the possibility of an origin (Ursprung)29 of history, and insists
that "truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are,
but the exteriority of accidents" (NGH, p. 81). There is no original identity
from which historical occurrences and developments can be traced; instead
there is only "dissention [and] ... disparity" (NGH, p. 79).
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Foucault uses Nietzsche's term Herkunft (descent) to refer to affiliation to
a certain determinate group: a race, a tradition, a social class, etc. Genealogy
is the analysis of Herkunft in order to show the multiplicity and disparity of
the events through which something was formed. It is not the search for
origins or the identification of points of historical continuity, but is rather the
exposition of "the hazardous play of dominations" (NGH, p. 85) through
which human history is created. Thus, for Foucault, "it is wrong to search for
descent in an uninterrupted continuity" (NGH, p. 83). For him, on the contrary,
the traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and
for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled (NOH, p. 88).

The concept of history unveiled by genealogical analysis "opposes history
given as continuity or representation of a tradition" (NGH, p. 93). It cannot
be unified or synthesized, for it is diffused, fragmented and broken.
In his earlier works, The Archaeology of Knowledge 30 and The Order of
Things, Foucault highlighted the discontinuity of history in terms of
epistemes. He defines an episteme as follows:
[the] historical a priori ... [which] in a given period, delimits in the totality
of experience a field of knowledge, defines the mode of being of the objects
that appear in that field, provides man's everyday perception with theoretical
powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about
things that is recognized to be true. 3l

According to this definition, an episteme is more akin to an ethos than to an
epoch, but this does not deter Foucault from delineating at least four
epistemes in European history of the last three hundred years. 32 There is no
logical continuity between epistemes, changes between them are arbitrary,
and are marked by an end-of-episteme situation in which things are no longer
"perceived, described, expressed, characterized, classified and known in the
same way"33 as previously. One commentator has claimed that, in the earlier
Foucault at least, "absolute discontinuity is the supreme interepistemic law."34
In Foucault's later work, however, there seems to be a softening of this
position; The History of Sexuality seems to have broken with the discontinuity
theory and allows for some possibility of continuity and even evolution. 35
While this might seems to be a dramatic volte face, it can be argued, as
Paul Rabinow does, that while Foucault stresses the abrupt changes in the
discourses of the human sciences, his main area of study, he has never in fact
glorified discontinuity to the extent of denying continuity completely. According to Rabinow, Foucault recognizes both continuity and discontinuity
in history and therefore operates his reading of history as a "grid of interpretation "36 through which he can analyze the relations of power and knowledge.
This possibility becomes clearer when situated within Foucault's anti-metaphysical and anti-idealist standpoint. Foucault's aim is to reject any claims
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to a necessary continuity in history, created by a metaphysics of reason or an
imposed transcendentalism. The metaphysical principle of a unitary thread
of reason running through history and reflecting the transcendental Subject
is an imposition upon the facts of history and not a deduction from them,
hence Foucault's spurning of a universal view of 'man'. Foucault rejects such
a principle in favor of the Nietzschean idea of an "effective history" (NGH,
pp. 86-90), a history without constants, which "introduces discontinuity into
our very being" (NGH, p. 88). From this perspective, despite his emphasis
on discontinuities, it is perhaps more accurate to describe Foucault as a
thinker of non-continuity, In other words, Foucault emphasizes the non-continuous character of history which his research claims to have uncovered,
without himself positing an ontology of history as radically discontinuous.
Indeed in a later interview clarifying some of his central ideas Foucault
was at pains to emphasize that he never was a philosopher of discontinuity.
Discussing The Order of Things Foucault says that his aim was to take obvious discontinuities in the human sciences at face value, and by doing so to
pose the following question: "is this discontinuity really a discontinuity? Or,
to be precise, what was the transformation needed to pass from one type of
knowledge to another type of knowledge?", Foucault goes on to assert that
"this is not at all a way of declaring the discontinuity of History; on the
contrary it is a way of posing discontinuity as a problem and above all as a
problem to be resolved. "37 If Foucault emphasizes discontinuities, it is because he finds empirical evidence for their existence, and not because he
posits their existence on an a priori theory of history.
Nevertheless, this does not prevent us from supposing that all areas of
human inquiry will have points of radical discontinuity when a new theory,
world-view or discovery disrupts the standard dogmas. The imperative of
investigation is then to uncover the ways in which continuity and transition
were maintained and the reasons given (then and now) for that continuity,
with the aim of discovering whether or not these reasons concur with the
evidence afforded by the original investigation. Take one obvious theological
example, namely, the decision of the early Christians to preach to the Gentiles. Modern scholarship is well aware of the divisions which this issue
caused in the early church, but subsequent Christian thinking has been unanimous in its agreement that this evident discontinuity was not really a discontinuity when the truly universal nature of the Christian message was
appreciated. Of course in this instance Christian theology has achieved its
own genealogical reading, but it is not hard to imagine more difficult cases
(e.g., the formation of the Protestant churches after the Reformation, the
continued relevance of a moral teaching based on 'natural law' in the face of
modern medical advances) where the question of continuity and discontinuity
requires much more attention than it has so far received.
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However, despite the disclaimers made by Foucault against those who see
him as an advocate of complete discontinuity, it is evident, even from this
brief outline, that Foucault's way of reading history entails an intense challenge to the way in which Christian theology has understood its own history, namely, as tradition: the continuous and unbroken handing-on of the
gospel by means of the scriptures and the life and teaching of the church.
Thus, the common Christian understanding of tradition has as its origin the
events and interpretations surrounding the life, death and resurrection of Jesus
Christ, and it is precisely the claim to continuity with the originating events
that Foucault asserts is questioned by genealogical analysis. Genealogy, he
says, "transposes the relationship ordinarily established between the eruption of an event and necessary continuity" (NGH, p. 88) and thus repudiates any theological or rationalist attempts to dissolve singular events into
an ideal continuity, understood as either a natural process or a teleological
movement.
A genealogical reading of history is, for Foucault, "the inverse of the
Christian world" which he perceives as "spun entirely by a divine spider"
(NGH, p. 88). What Foucault rejects here is not continuity or even tradition
per se, but any tendency towards a 'natural' or teleological development
which would place the burden of a mechanistic determinism upon the "countless lost events" of history which admit of no final landmark or reference-point.
In other words, Foucault is warning us that tradition is not something which we
can presume as an ontological datum, but is rather something which we create
out of the disjointed phenomena of history, while frequently neglecting to
notice the radical breaks which distance us, unconsciously, from our past.
The crucial issue to be addressed, therefore, is not the accuracy of
Foucault's historical research,38 but rather what his enterprise tells us about
the concept of tradition: by careful analysis of the past we come to a realization of the discontinuities in history and are thus impelled to search for the
grounds of continuity as well as warned against the creation of absolute metaphysical continuities. Furthermore, we are alerted to both our own distance from
and closeness to previous eras, cultures and systems of thought, and to the
strategies and mechanisms of power through which each tradition has been
formed. Foucault teaches us to think of the vulnerability and ambiguity of all
traditions. Within this reading of Foucault's work it continues to make sense,
against Megill and Rorty, to speak of a crisis of continuity engendered by contemporary epistemological and metaphysical skepticism. After all, by continuing
to advocate radical discontinuity these thinkers are themselves creating a tradition of sorts, and there is a strong tradition of disclaiming metaphysics from
Nietzsche to Rorty! What remains to be thought through is how, given this
postmodern crisis of continuity, we can continue to affirm the concept of
tradition at all; and if we do affirm tradition on this conceptual level, we are
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impelled to investigate the further question of the power mechanisms of the
tradition and of the interests which they serve.

3. The Future of Tradition
If we accept Foucault's thesis that each tradition is, potentially at least, a
set of broken and fragmented events with no absolute coherence, unified only
by the imposition of a transcendental framework which reflects an idealist
metaphysics, then a re-appraisal of the theological concept of tradition is
called for. Obviously, a material investigation (Le., one which undertakes a
historical analysis along the lines of those done by Foucault) of elements of
the tradition is beyond the bounds of the present article, so I will simply
highlight a number of areas on the formal theological level where Foucault's
critique of tradition can provoke interest.
a). Methodology. Methodologically, a Foucauldian reading of any tradition
requires close attention to the breaks, disruptions and discontinuities which
the tradition has attempted to suppress and to the network of power relations
which has operated to give the tradition its particular character. This would
demand, to employ Derrida's term, a 'deconstruction' or unravelling of those
parts of the tradition where the claims to continuity were strongest, thereby
suggesting that the threat or reality of discontinuity was also present. To take
two of many possible examples: to what extent is the current teaching of the
Roman Catholic church on divorce actually 'traditional'; and, what impact
did the desire to maintain continuity of teaching have on the final form of
Humanae Vitae? How is power exercised within the church on these crucial
moral issues? How did such issues of family morality become the subject of
a public and universal church teaching? A 'genealogical' reading such as is
demanded in these examples entails detailed investigation and critique of the
tradition, not merely citation and/or appeal to authority, least of all to authorities or texts which are themselves under review.
The Foucauldian question to theology is, then, how to theologise with a
tradition whose continuity can no longer be guaranteed either by a guiding
authority or a metaphysics of history and whose very existence is branded
with a network of power exchanges which we have yet to understand. When
Foucault asserts that "it is not possible for power to be exercised without
knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power"39, he
presents a challenge to all disciplines to undertake an investigation of their
own methodologies which are designed to produce knowledge. That the production of theological knowledge is intimately linked to the production and
exercise of power is something which theological methodology has never
seriously considered. What is at stake then is our own understanding of how
transition from one form of knowledge and thinking to new forms is possible
without destroying the tradition completely. What is a stake is nothing less
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than our own capacity to shape both the present and the future, to create new
know ledges and new relations of power which influence each other for the
better. Dissipation of long-established authorities, continuities or power
structures does not destroy the past; it simply cal1s for its re-configuration.
How the past, and through it the present, is re-configured becomes one of the
primary tasks of a post modem theology.
b). Hermeneutics. Foucault saw the aim of his work as to enquire into a
specific historical subject and to "bring it to light as it existed at the time. "40
The primary purpose of his historical work was to describe the operating
power mechanisms as closely as possible and not to provide a comprehensive
explanatory theory to account for all the diverse realities which any era
contains. Foucault's distrust of explanatory theory would seem to result from
a desire to allow a particular history to speak for itself so that the disruptions,
discontinuities and displacements of a tradition are not subsumed under the
umbrella of an all-encompassing theory or a neat series of authoritative texts
and interpretations which would then function as the accepted ideology of
the community.
Despite the fact that Foucault has been criticized for this lack of attention
to hermeneutics 41 , it seems unlikely that he was so blind to hermeneutical
possibilities as to think that interpretation could be infinitely deferred, even
granted that a consummate theory of explanation is not desirable. As Paul
Ricoeur has pointed out, the risk which interpretation takes in saying that this
or that text or event has a particular meaning always involves us in a "conflict
of interpretations"42 which is not easily resolved. But this risk cannot be
avoided by trying to remain on some safe level of purely empirical description. It would seem unnecessary, then, to give an ontological status to
Foucault's priority of genealogical description over explanatory theory. This
priority is rather temporal and strategic, chal1enging us to leave aside our
hermeneutical baggage and al10w the historical evidence to shock us into new
configurations and readings of the tradition.
Foucault did, however, sometimes nod in the direction of hermeneutics.
Consider the fol1owing passage in which he claims that all his work is in a
certain sense a fiction:
I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean
to say, however, that truth is therefore absent. It seems to me that the possibility exists for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to induce
effects of truth, and for bringing it about that a true discourse engenders or
'manufactures' something that does not as yet exist, that is, 'fictions' it. 43

Both the hermeneutical possibilities referred to in this passage are applicable
to aspects of Christian theology. The first, namely that a fictional discourse
can induce effects of truth, is the principle on which we accept that the Song
of Songs, the Book of Revelation and even the parables of Jesus are revela-
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tory. The second, namely that a true discourse engenders unthought fictions,
raises the interesting question of the role of imagination in theological hermeneutics. When Christian theology comes to interpret a tradition which it
adheres to as in some way 'true', it can only do so successfully by an act of
creative imagination which 'fictions' new ways of understanding through
which the tradition can be appropriated in the present.
In discussing the relationship between tradition and imaginative innovation, Paul Ricoeur has written that tradition must be viewed not as the "inert
transmission of some already dead deposit of material but as the living transmission of an innovation always capable of being reactivated by a return to
the most creative moments of poetic activity. "44 Commenting on this text
from Ricoeur, Richard Kearney says that "tradition can only survive, can only
pass itself on from one generation to the next, by fostering creative innovation
in its midst."45 Thus, whether one prefers Ricoeur's 'poetic' imagination or
Foucault's 'fictions', the message for theology is the same: history or tradition cannot be successfully appropriated without hermeneutical activity
which employs a creative imagination. The origin of many doctrines and
theologies (e.g., Augustine's psychological model of the Trinity, Anselm's
doctrine of atonement, contemporary process theology) would be unthinkable
without the role of such an imagination.
However, what Foucault alerts us to above all is the way in which such
hermeneutical innovation, while avoiding the error of simply repeating the
tradition, lacks a means of analyzing the role of power in the origins and
dynamic unfolding of the tradition. A Foucauldian genealogy of power structures can provide an important corrective to a theological hermeneutics of
innocence which would assume too quickly that the tradition is an unblemished continuity of benign influences (or, the opposite, that the tradition has
offered only oppression and coercion). If theology accepts with Foucault that
all traditions are marked by traces of power structures which are not immediately
evident, and if it accepts that these or other power structures are constitutive of
the tradition's origins, then it would seem that some form of genealogical analysis
should be a necessary component of all theological hermeneutics.
c.) Discourse. Towards what form of discourse on the tradition does a
Foucauldian genealogy prompt us? Primarily, it is a discourse on discourse;
more precisely, it is a critical reflection of theological thinking on itself. In
an essay on Kant's Was ist Aufkliirung? Foucault reads this text as the first
problematizing of thought by thought, a self-consciousness which seeks to
uncover an ontology of the present through a questioning of the discourse
which rules the present. 46 This problematizing of a contemporary discourse
involves us in analysis of the discourse of our own specific culture. In
Foucault's words, "it is no longer simply the question of how one belongs to
a human community in general, but rather that of how one belongs to a certain
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'us,' to an us that concerns a cultural totality characteristic of one's own
time."47 In other words, it is the present discourse of the community, generated by the tradition, which becomes of interest. No less than the philosopher
in her discipline, the theologian is impelled to ask: 'What is this present in
which I find myself? What is the tradition which has determined it? What
mechanisms of power within the tradition govern the discourse in which I
engage, lay down its rules and conventions, set the boundaries of its progress?
What unconscious ideologies operate in the practices of this community?'
Is this questioning of discourse to be found in contemporary critical theology, for example in liberation and feminist theologies? To a certain extent,
yes, through their rejection of the way in which the present system of discourse seeks to keep in place structures of oppression based on economic or
sexual discrimination. In a recent article on a feminist reconstruction of
biblical texts,48 Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza indicates the type of discourse
on the tradition which I am suggesting here. Schiissler Fiorenza argues that
for a feminist theology to be effective it is not enough simply to develop new
readings within the methodological and epistemological parameters of the
dominant patriarchal theologies which perpetuate patriarchy by continuing to
advocate scholarly disinterestedness as a prerequisite to investigation of the
tradition. For a feminist (or any other) theology to break down this situation
it is imperative to "interrogate the power/knowledge relations inscribed in
biblical texts and in the contemporary discourses on biblical studies. "49 This
entails a re-reading of the texts in the light of the demands of the present; it
is, as I suggested above, a partly imaginative enterprise. But, as with
Foucault, Schiissler Fiorenza denies that this re-figuring of history is a lie:
"Such an emancipatory reconstruction of our cultural and religious past is
not a fictive creation out of nothing, but a disciplined argument for a different
historical consciousness and imagination. "50 A Foucauldian reading of a tradition
constantly seeks to undermine the dominant ideologies by calling into question
the discourse which says that the tradition be read in this way or that way only,
the same critical and interested reading which Schiissler Fiorenza suggests
must be brought to the patriarchal structures of contemporary theology.
Nevertheless, despite the promising steps being taken by theologians such
as Schiissler Fiorenza, it is not an unfair assertion to say that the task of
uncovering the genealogy of the discourse of the theological present is one
which is only beginning. The role that the theologian or philosopher plays in
this discourse is primarily one of facilitating the process of questioning. The
primary task of the critical religious thinker is to examine the tradition, not
to repeat it, and through examining the tradition to allow the present to be
reshaped more closely along the lines of what the tradition truly stands for.
For example, what Foucault asked of psychiatry, the theologian asks of the
theologies, laws, ecclesial structures and moral teachings of the contemporary
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church, namely, is it possible that it "is not on good tenns with its own
history."51 In other words, is contemporary thinking genuinely in line with the
tradition, does it welcome investigation of the tradition, or is it afraid of the
potentially disruptive nature of its own history? A similar role can be played by
the philosopher in regard to the rational foundations of theological argument,
by the historian in regard to the socio-political origins of some doctrines, etc.
This analysis of the discourse of the present through attention to the tradition raises again the question of power and the way in which power and
powers control current theological discourse. Theology, if it is to take
Foucault's challenge seriously, must ask: what is the connection between
power and that theological knowledge which is now being, or has been over
the centuries, discovered or employed?
Let us focus on one example of contemporary interest, the question of the
ordination of women. A genealogical reading of the history of this question,
which is also, as Foucault reminds us, the history of the present, asks questions such as these: what mechanisms are at work in the discourse concerning
the ordination of women and the refusal of many theologians and church
authorities to view a generally accepted human right (equality of the sexes)
as a valid theological criterion?; what view of tradition is operative here?;
what is the history of the power relations and the theological knowledge to
which they gave rise, a knowledge which seems capable of being utilized on
both sides of a very divisive argument?; to what extent is progress on this
and other issues prevented by a systematic control of discourse which maintains within clearly defined limits the grounds for argument, the criteria
acceptable, and the evidence admissible for a judgement to be reached. Analysis of this discourse to reveal the control mechanisms at work is as much
the task of a critical theology as is engagement in the discourse itself.
Foucault has reminded us that no analysis of discourse is complete without
an investigation of the power relations in which the knowledge appealed to
in the discourse originated and which continue to govern that discourse. This
is a challenge which theology has yet to accept.
d.) The Body. Foucault's studies on traditions such as penology, the asylum
and sexuality have highlighted the ways in which power is exercised over the
subject by means of the disciplining of the body. Despite the obviously positive
connotations of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, it is generally
accepted that Christianity (at least since Augustine) has operated with a predominantly negative view of the flesh. Furthennore, Christianity has contributed in
no small way to the institutionalization of the body; schools, hospitals, seminaries, monasteries and convents, religious houses, etc. all played a role in the way
in which the body has come to be organized in modern society. To point this out
is in no way to impugn negative connotations to each of these institutions or to
link them causally to a pessimistic view of sexuality. Nevertheless, theology still
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lacks a history which would give attention to the specifics of the body's
treatment in Christianity. Perhaps the closest to such a work which we have
is Peter Brown's fascinating study The Body and Society: Men, Women, and
Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity. S2 It is not surprising to discover
that Foucault and Brown each influenced the other's work. 53
While the history of the body in Christianity remains to be written, it is not
difficult to see that the legacy of this history, whatever the details of its
development, has left contemporary Christianity with a sophisticated network
of relations and codes surrounding the body. From a Foucauldian point of
view contemporary Christianity seems to reflect an esoteric concept of the
body. For example, it is usually the 'spiritual' consequences of physical acts
which have primary importance in judging their level of acceptability; this
requires the existence (especially in Roman Catholicism) of very clear laws
regarding the body. Roman Catholic Canon Law and moral teaching lay down
quite specific rules with regard to the exact nature of the act of coitus in the
consummation of marriage, forms of contraception, certain dietary rules, the
law of celibacy, restricted access to sacred places (the prohibition of altargirls), the dress of priests and religious, etc. These moral teachings and laws
merit varying levels of theological justification, but they all underscore the
view that one approaches the body only through the medium of the 'spiritual',
i.e., through a long history of the 'spiritualization' of the body which has
been developed through theologies of creation, sin, suffering, etc., and in rites
of initiation and passage (baptism, marriage, last rites). The Christian body
exists from cradle to grave within this network of symbolization in which the
body is more than a simple body; it is part of the Body of Christ, the church,
and is therefore no longer its own possession. However, to highlight these
aspects of the treatment of the body is not to imply that there has been a
unilateral 'tradition' of oppression of the body in Christianity. As Foucault
has shown us, the genealogical imperative is to read the mechanisms of power
over the body through an interpretive 'grid' which allows both continuity and
discontinuity, both benign influence and oppression, to surface where they
are actually part of the historical reality.
Perhaps one of the most disturbing, but least emphasized aspects of liberation theology for the established, 'spiritualized' theology of the body which
has gained precedence in Christianity is its emphasis on the body per se, on
how much it is fed, on its shelter, on its right to protection from abuse by
drugs, torture, or overwork, etc. Despite this liberation emphasis on bodiliness, however, Christian theology has generally been slow to respond to the
modern emphasis on the autonomy of the body (e.g., its sexual expression,
its glorification in sport, its protection by international conventions and
agreements such as the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights). The
admittedly mammoth task of re-examining the history of both the theology
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of the body and the actual treatment of the body in Christianity is now overdue.
Foucault, through his introduction of the subjects of the body as body into
postmodem discourse has simply pointed out the necessity of this task.

Conclusion
Despite these potential theological fruits of Foucault's work, his own research cannot simply be adopted as a model for another discipline. Given the
idiosyncratic nature of Foucault's genealogical analysis and the problematic
accuracy of his conclusions within limited areas of research, a note of caution
must be adopted. Both the continuities and the discontinuities which Foucault
demonstrates in one sphere of investigation (e.g., penology) may not necessarily be true in the case of another sphere (e.g., the university, politics,
religion); and the power relations discovered in one era or area of life may
not necessarily be paralleled in another. Generalizations must be avoided.
The import of Foucault's work, rather, is that he alerts us to the danger of
assuming that the past was a homogeneous, univocal reality with which we
can claim direct continuity. This should impel us to an analysis of the particular past in question, in our case that of the history of Christianity's interpretation of its own originating events, in order to ascertain from the phenomena
what continuities or discontinuities do or do not exist. A theology which
would take Foucault's challenge seriously would admit from the outset that
the continuity of tradition can no longer be a premise from which we deduce
other truths, or even an attainable goal which we have not yet reached. At
best tradition is an unresolved dialectic of broken continuities and interrupting discontinuities with which we engage in constant discourse.
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